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COMPARING APPLES TO ORANGES: LESSONS FROM
THE FAILURE OF U.S. APPLE EXPORTS TO JAPAN
Dustin R. Klinger
Abstract: In 1994, the United States and Japan agreed to permit reciprocal fresh
apple imports after decades of negotiations. However, U.S. apple exports to Japan were
a commercial failure. Initial sales peaked in 1995, then quickly declined, and no U.S.
apples have been shipped to Japan since 1997. The United States blames unfair
regulations for this failure. This Comment reviews the history of the U.S.-Japan apple
dispute, analyzes Japan's apple import regulations, and concludes that those regulations
aggravated, but did not cause the commercial failure of U.S. apple exports to Japan.
Instead, U.S. apple exports failed because of unexpected price competition from Japanese
apples, insufficient marketing efforts, and consumer rejection of the only two varieties
registered for export. Unless these underlying problems are also addressed, efforts to
reduce Japan's regulatory restrictions on apples will not lead to successful exports.
I. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Government claims that unduly restrictive Japanese
regulation caused the failure of U.S. apple exports to Japan.' This
Commnent challenges that claim, and concludes that the U.S. apple export
failure was caused more by factors such as Japanese consumer rejection,
price competition from Japanese apples, and insufficient marketing than by
regulatory barriers. The United States has challenged Japan's
administrative exclusion of U.S. apples for over twenty years.2 The apple
I U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky and Agriculture Secretary Dan Glickman have
repeatedly stated that Japan's quarantine procedures continue to unfairly exclude American apples. They
sent official demands to the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries as well as to the Minister of
International Trade and Industry, for an explanation of the variety specific quarantine standards which
impede the export of U.S. apples to Japan without resolution. The United States also filed an official
complaint against Japan on this matter with the World Trade Organization. USTR Seeks Comments on
Japan Food Quarantines, 14 INT'L TRADE REP. 1765 (1997); Tim Shorrock, US to Investigate Japanese
Barriers to Fruit Imports: Tokyo's Testing Rules are an Issue for the WTO, J. COM., Oct. 17, 1997, at 9A;
Biekoku, Kenekisei Kyogi wo Ydkyii [United States Demands Conference on Quarantine Procedures],
Kyodo, Oct. 2, 1996; US Asks Japan for Formal Explanation for Alleged Barriers to Apple Imports, Int'l
Trade Daily (BNA), Oct. 2, 1996; Japan Refutes U.S. Complaint on Apple Testing, Japan Econ. Newswire,
Oct. 1, 1996; Japan, US. Remain Opposite on Apple Quarantine, Japan Econ. Newswire, June 6, 1997
available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allnews file.
2 The apple dispute was a low profile issue until the early 1990s. William DiBenedetto, E. coli
Another Worm in Apple Talks-Outbreak Could Snarl US-Japan Negotiations, J. CoM., Nov. 6, 1996, at
I A; David Postman, Washington to Japan: Buy Our Apples, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 3, 1997, at A 1.
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dispute follows a common pattern of U.S. complaints that Japanese policy
unfairly prevents U.S. products from being sold in Japan.'
In 1994, the United States and Japan agreed to eliminate apple import
prohibitions between the two countries ("Apple Agreement").4 Initial U.S.
apple exports to Japan peaked in 1995, but ended when U.S. apple growers
unilaterally quit exporting apples in 1997 because they were frustrated by
what they considered unfair regulatory requirements.5
This Comment will first review the long history of U.S.-Japan apple
trade negotiations. It will then analyze Japan's apple regulations before and
after the Apple Agreement. Comparing the affect of Japan's apple regulations
to other factors, this Comment argues that Japanese consumers rejected U.S.
apples because of: 1) taste and quality, 2) the unexpected introduction of
competitively priced domestic apples, 3) chemical and disease scares, and 4)
insufficient commitment and marketing by U.S. apple exporters.
This Comment finally predicts that the WTO Dispute Panel decision
ordering Japan to end variety-specific testing requirements will eventually
result in decreased regulations for agricultural exports to Japan. However,
this decrease in regulations will benefit growers continuing to export apples
to Japan more than U.S. growers unless the true causes of the 1995-97 U.S.
export failure are addressed.
II. BACKGROUND
Relations between the United States and Japan are primarily
economic and often contentious.' U.S.-Japan trade disputes date back to
1853 when Americans sailed armed ships into Japanese waters to demand
trade access.7 Most trade disputes between the countries have been sparked
Paul Blustein, How Do They Like Them Apples: Japanese Consumers Taste US.-Grown Fruit,
Finally, WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 1995, at DI.
4 White House Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, President's Statement on Export of
Apples to Japan, Aug. 23, 1994 (visited Nov. 7, 1998) <http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-
res/12R?um:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1 99 4 /8/23/2.text.l>. The Apple Agreement was not a single written
document, but a mutual agreement by trade negotiators to make the regulatory changes required to allow
for the reciprocal trade of apples within the sanitary and plant inspection rules of each country. THE
AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IN JAPAN, MAKING TRADE TALKS WORK 121 (1997).
' Nigel Holloway, Forbidden Fruit, FARE. ECON. REV., Aug. 8, 1996 at 50, available in 1996 WL-FEER 10569567; Brent Evans, Imports of Apples to Japan: Washington State 's Perspective-Washington
Apple Commission Statement, (visited Nov. I, 1998) <http://www.voicenet.co.jp/-davald/
taniibrentevans.html>; US. Ends Apple Exports to Japan, Jiji Press Ticker Service, Dec. 24, 1997.
6 EDWIN 0. REISCHAUER, THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN 19, 335-36 (3rd ed. 1965).
7 Frank K. Upham, Introduction: Symposium on the US.-Japanese Trade Relationship, 22
VOL. 8 No. I
JANUARY 1999 US APPLE EXPORTS TO JAPAN
by American demands for market access to Japan, or by complaints of
unfair competition from Japanese exports. 8 The apple dispute is typical of
the market access type of dispute where U.S. trade negotiators push for
changes in Japanese policy to facilitate a particular U.S. business interest.
9
Trade agreements are regularly negotiated by the United States and Japan to
settle trade disputes, but most are ineffective.'
°
The apple dispute, like most agricultural trade disputes, is fueled as
much by political as economic interests.1" In terms of economic value, the
apple dispute involves an insignificant part of total U.S.-Japan trade, 12 but
the political concerns of those who represent apple growers in both
countries keep the issue alive.'
3
Since the end of World War II, both nations have followed
agriculture policies seeking to protect domestic farmers: the U.S. through
export support and Japan through protection of farmers from outside
competition.' 4 These policies have created inherent and ongoing conflict. 5
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 375 (1989); REISCHAUER, supra note 6, at 9 (describing U.S. Admiral Mathew Perry's
1853 voyage to Japan with his fleet of armored "black ships" and negotiation of an agreement to open trade
relations between the U.S. and isolationist Japan).
8 Upham, supra note 7, at 375.
9 Blustein, supra note 3.
" Of 45 trade pacts studied, only 13 have played significant roles in opening Japanese markets. Nancey
Dunne, US. Trade Deals with Japan Often Fail to Achieve Aims, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1997 at 4(l); Only 13 of 45
Accords with Japan Succeeded in Market Access, Business Group Reports, 14 INT'L TRADE REP. 76 (1997).
" Agriculture holds symbolic and political importance in international trade far beyond its economic
value. Micheal R. Reich et al., Agriculture, The Political Economy of Structural Change, in AMERICA
VERSUS JAPAN 151, 152-55 (Thomas K. McCraw ed., 1986). Farmers have long been the main support
base for Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party. JON WORONOFF, JAPANESE TARGETING 109 (1992).
" The total value of U.S. apple sales to Japan over two years was US $17 million compared to US
$200 billion in total U.S.-Japan trade per year. Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky, The Future of U.S.-
Japan Trade Relations, 25 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 1287, 1289 (1994); Steve Wilhelm, Apple Exports
Headed for a Record, but Japan Sales Lag, PUGET SOUND BUS. J., Nov. 29, 1996, at 4.
" John Davies, Foley Presses Japanese to Open to U.S. Apples, J. COM., June I, 1993, at 4A;
Richard L. Holman, Japanese Seek to Bar US. Apples: Lawsuit by Farmers to Block Import of American
Apples, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 1994, at A 17; Beikoku Ringo Yunydi he, Nosuisho ga Kaikin Kettei [MAFF
Lifts Ban on US. Apple Imports], Kyodo News Wire, Aug. 20, 1994.
"4 Both nations' farmers have suffered from the structural changes of industrialization that
universally decrease the relative share of national economic output from agricultural production. Reich et
al., supra note II at 151. While total U.S. agricultural exports to Japan have increased, certain politically
sensitive sectors such as rice and fruit have been insulated from foreign competition. Holloway, supra note
5 at 50. Over time, Japan's protected sectors have fallen further behind world efficiency levels and grown
more dependent on government protection from outside competition. John 0. Haley, Luck Law, Culture
and Trade. The Intractability of United States-Japan Trade Conflict, 22 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 403, 405
(1989); Woronoff, supra note 1I, at I l1.
" One political commentator analyzed the tension between U.S. agriculture export drives and
Japanese protectionism, correctly predicting that Japan's unwillingness to permit more American
agricultural imports would result in further deterioration in trade relations. James M. Lyons, Japan's
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Without government support and protection, many Japanese farming
sectors arguably could not survive against the lower prices of world market
competition.' 6 Even Japan's strongest defenders admit that agriculture is one
area where Japan is not open to free trade. 17 Japanese farms in general, and
apple orchards in particular, function on a much smaller scale than their U.S.
counterparts and are far more dependant on manual labor. ' The high price of
agricultural land prevents Japanese apple growers from expanding their
operations to the greater economies of scale enjoyed by U.S. apple growers.' 9
The inability of Japanese farmers to expand, as well as labor intensive
growing practices, make it impossible for them to compete at world market
prices. 20  The advantage of large-scale apple production is illustrated by the
fact that apple growers in the state of Washington produce twice as many
apples as all of Japan with only thirty five percent more land, but less than
Quantitative Restrictions on the Importation of Agricultural Products, 15 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 569
(1983). U.S. farmers have actively increased exports over the past fifty years with government support.
Bruce Gardner, The Economics of US. Agricultural Policy, in U.S.-JAPANESE AGRICULTURAL TRADE
RELATIONS 182 (Emery N. Castle & Kenzo Hemmi eds., 1992). Japan has experienced a corresponding
increase in dependence on agricultural imports (outside of protected sectors) primarily from the United
States in spite of attempts to maintain food production security and self-reliance. Reich et al., supra note
I I at 158 (Table 5-3); see also Liane L. Heggy, Free Trade Meets US. Farm Policy: Life After the
Uruguay Round, 25 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1367 (1994).
16 Woronoff, supra note 11, at 6 1; Lyons supra note 15; see generally How Much do Barriers to
Imports Cost Japanese Consumers?, ECONOMIST, Jan. 7, 1995, at 58.
" AKIO MORITA, MADE IN JAPAN: AKIO MORITA AND SONY 267 (1986).
For a good description of the labor intensive methods that Japanese apples growers use, see Sheryl
Wudunn, Imports Take No Bite Out ofJapan's Pampered Apples, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, July 22, 1995, at
News. Japanese farms average 1.1 hectares per owner farmer, compared to 157 hectares in the U.S. Reich et
al., supra note I I at 164. The small size of Japanese farms is due in part to post-World War 1I U.S.
Occupation land reforms that dispersed large land holdings out to individual farmers. Id Apple growers in
Japan tend on average 0.51 hectares (1.3 acres), compared to an average of nearly 7 hectares (17 acres) for all
U.S. apple growers, and 20 hectares (48 acres) for Washington apple growers. 1997 U.S. DEP'T. AGRIC:
JAPAN ANNUAL FRESH DECIDUOUS FRUIT REP, Sept. 17, 1997[hereinafter 1997 Japan Fruit Report], at I;
Washington Apple Commission ("WAC") Homepage (visited Nov. 23, 1998)
<http://www.bestapples.com/Educational/Industry/Trivia.html>; MAFF Homepage (visited Nov. 23, 1998)
<http://www.maff.go.jp/abst/form l/5ab/24a.htm I>.
'9 In 1989, an average price for farmland in Japan was US $10,000 per square meter. Kozo
Yamamura, LDP Dominance and High Land Price in Japan: A Study in Positive Political Economy, in
LAND ISSUES IN JAPAN: A POLICY FAILURE? 33, 45 (John 0. Haley & Kozo Yamamura eds.,
1992)[hereinafter LAND ISSUES IN JAPAN]. Land prices have generally declined since 1989. Jathon
Sapsford, The Outlook: Japanese Real Estate Has Some Bright Spots, WALL ST. J., June 1, 1998, at Al.
However, the price calculated by Professor Yamamura still illustrates the high cost of farmers have faced
in Japan compared to the United States.
20 One political economist calculated the impact of subsidies on agricultural land prices and
concluded that the high land prices and lack of agricultural land consolidation are a result of subsidies, tax
valuation and "shadow values" (prices increases because of possible sale for development) of land that
encourage farmers to keep small plots. Yoshimi Kuroda, Price-Support Programs and Land Movement in
Japanese Rice Production, in LAND ISSUES IN JAPAN, supra note 19.
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half the work force. 21  At the same time, the expansion of large scale U.S.
production has increased the dependence of U.S. farmers, and Washington
State apple growers in particular, on export markets to prevent over-supply
from decreasing prices. 22  These structural factors reinforce the policy
tensions underlying the U.S.-Japan apple dispute.
A. History of the US.-Japan Apple Dispute
The U.S.-Japan apple dispute is the oldest active trade dispute
between the two countries, with official complaints dating back to 1971.23
In spite of legal provisions allowing imports, U.S. apples were effectively
banned by the Plant Epidemic Prevention Law, which prohibits the
introduction of diseases or insects not officially, recognized as present in
Japan. 24  To comply with the Plant Epidemic Prevention Law, U.S. apples
had to be approved as free of disease and pests by the Ministry of
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries ("MAFF"). 25  However, the standards
and procedures for testing and preventing the spread of fire blight and the
codling moth (common in U.S. apples) for MAFF approval are not
expressly defined in the Plant Epidemic Prevention Law.26  MAFF
2 Forty thousand large-scale farms in the United States grow an average of 200 to 250 million boxes
of apples each year. 1995 USITC PUBLICATION No. 2875, INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION INDUSTRY
& TRADE SUMMARY OF CERTAIN FRESH DECIDUOUS FRUITS 16 (1995). available in LEXIS 1995 ITC
LEXIS 222. Over half of U.S. apple production is in Washington State by 3,800 growers on 73,000
hectares (172,000 acres) with 45,000 to 50,000 people employed in harvest and packing. WAC Home Page
(visited Oct. 19, 1998) < htp://www.bestapples.com/CoreFacts/cf 2.html >. In contrast, 90,000 small-
scale growers in Japan produce only 32 million boxes (899,000 m.t.) of apples each year on 47,000
hectares. Golden Sour, ECONOMIST, Sept. I1, 1993, at 63; MAFF Homepage (visited Oct. 19, 1998)
<http://www.maff.go.jp/abst/form I/5ab/24a.html>.
22 The fall 1998 apple crop faces a price collapse due to a record crop, faltering Asian markets, and
increasing low end competition from China. Lynda V. Mapes, Apple Growers Taking Huge Financial Hit,
SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 11, 1998, at A1; Stephen H. Dunphy, The Newsletter: A Record Apple Crop May be
in the Making, SEATTLE TIMES, May 20 1998, at B 1.
23 U.S. Lodges Complaint Against Japan's Apple Import Ban, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA), Apr. 8,
1993; Blustein supra note 3; DiBenedetto, supra note 2.
2, Shokubutsu Boeki Ho [Plant Epidemic Prevention Law], Law No. 151 of 1950. The banned
diseases include fire blight and the codling moth which are found in U.S. apple orchard. See Kathryn
Barry Stelljes & Dennis Senfi, Fire Blight Control. Nature's Way; Biocontrol of Fire Blights, AGRIC. RES.,
Jan. 1998. at 14, available in LEXIS, News Library, ASAPII file.
25 For further discussion of MAFF see infra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
26 The requirements for approval were sequentially revealed to U.S. negotiators as each requirement
was fulfilled. In March 1993, before the Apple Agreement, U.S. Ambassador to Japan Michael Armacost
openly concluded that the sequentially increasing MAFF requirements for apples were not based on
legitimate phytosanitary concems, stating, "[C]ontinuation of a technical dialogue with the Ministry of
Agriculture has proven to be feckless when what we are dealing with in reality is a politically driven non-
tariff trade barrier." State Dep't unclassified cable 5105, Mar. 22, 1993, cited in David Johanson &
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requested and received various data and information from U.S. apple
growers wanting to export to Japan over the years, but by not providing
final inspection procedures, MAFF effectively banned U.S. apples. 27 MAFF
responded to U.S. complaints of stalling by reaffirming that Japan's
standards and requirements were necessary health protections and that
further study was required.2"
While the level of official attention given to the apple dispute has
vacillated over time, particularly between U.S. Presidential administrations,
the Clinton Administration made the apple dispute a high priority and
increased pressure on Japan to end its prohibition on U.S. apples.2 9
Consequently, negotiations continued until August 23, 1994, when
President Clinton proudly announced the opening of Japan's apple market
to U.S. exports as part of a reciprocal agreement eliminating apple import
prohibitions between both nations. 3' The Apple Agreement was hailed a
combined diplomatic and business success in "getting tough" with Japan.3
William Bryant, Eliminating Phytosanitary Trade Barriers: The Effects of the Uruguay Round Agreement
on California Agricultural Exports, 6 S.J. AGRI. L. REV. I, 21 (1996).
27 Kyodo, supra note 13. U.S. apple growers felt that MAFF was intentionally creating new requests
for data as a policy of delay. Washington farmers eventually referred to MAFF as the "bug of the month
club." Lori Matsukawa, Washington State Apples in Japan: Communication Plans and Strategies 37 (1996)(unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Washington)(on file with the University of Washington Library).
28 Japan Again Refuses Demands to Open Market to US. Apples, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA), Aug. 10, 1993.29 Stephen H. Dunphy, Seattle, Apples at Center Stage in Trade Talks, SEATLE TIMES, Sept. 29,
1996, at Fl. The Clinton administration's high level of priority on the apple issue was illustrated by
President Clinton handing a basket of Washington apples to Prime Minister Hosokawa during a press
conference at the Seattle APEC Conference in 1994, and the appointment of Tom Foley (former Speaker of
the United States House of Representatives and U.S. Congressman from the apple growing area of
Washington State) as U.S. Ambassador to Japan. Les Blumenthal, State Businesses Applaud Foley's
Appointment to Japan, TACOMA NEWS TRIBUNE, Sept. 3, 1997, at D I; Davies, supra note 13; Jim Camden,
It's Official, Foley Picked as Japan Envoy, SPOKESMAN-REV., Aug. 30, 1997, at Al; see also Foley
Presses Japanese to Open to U.S. Apples, J. COM., June I, 1993, at 4A.
0 Supra note 4.
3' The Clinton administration considered the Apple Agreement a positive example of its effective
"get tough" policy towards Japan. Paul Blustein, The Boost and Boast of Trade Agreements with Japan,
WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 1996, at D9. Under the "get tough" policy, U.S. negotiators demanded affirmative
official Japanese action on specific products and objective result commitments to insure the introduction of
U.S. imports, while threatening increased tariffs or prohibition of Japanese exports to the United States if
the demands were not met. As one former Japanese Trade official noted:
Once the staffing problems were settled, however [the Clinton Administration] came at us with
surprising speed and intensity, with both Commerce Secretary Ron Brown and U.S. Trade
Representative Mickey Kantor demanding hard numbers, targets, market share, indicators and
the like. Their demands were so harsh that it was almost as if they didn't recognize Japan as a
sovereign nation...
Younosuke Tanaka, Beyond Rhetoric: An In-Depth Look into the Core Issues and Causes of Strained US.-
Japan relations, BY THE WAY, Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 38 (interviewing former Administrative Vice-Minister of
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1. 1994 Apple Agreement
The 1994 Apple Agreement led to a change in Japanese agricultural
import regulations3" and forced MAFF to provide the necessary inspection
standards for Red Delicious and Golden Delicious apples imported directly
from the United States.33 U.S. apple imports are now possible, upon MAFF
inspection and approval.3" MAFF used the information and inspection
reports gathered from U.S. growers over the years leading up to the Apple
Agreement as the basic protocol for final inspection and approval. 5 The
MAFF protocol requires: registration of orchard areas designated to grow
apples for Japan, a 500 meter separation of registered apple trees from other
related fruit trees, direct MAFF officer inspection of the designated trees
three times a year, extended cold treatment and fumigation with methyl
bromide before shipment, and customs inspection upon arrival in Japan.36
2. Japanese Apple Growers Protest Against Imported Apples
Even with the protocol restrictions, Japanese apple growers actively
protested against the Apple Agreement, claiming that lower priced foreign
apple imports, particularly from the U.S., were a threat to their continued
existence and they went so far as to file a law suit against MAFF in order to
block imports.37 Japanese apple growers actively opposed the entry of
foreign apples, and promoted a message that imported apples endanger the
health of the Japanese people and will increase plant disease.38
International Trade and Industry Yuji Tanahashi). The Media aspects of U.S. Apple exports have been
documented in great detail. Matsukawa, supra note 27. Apple industry representatives boasted, "The apple
growers accomplished in 18 months what 23 years of trade negotiations failed to do." Jeff Bond, Committed
to the Core, WASH. CEO, Aug. 1996, at 36, 37. But see Yoichi Funabashi, A View From Asia (I), FOREIGN
POL'Y, Winter 1997-1998, at 51-54 (criticizing President Clinton for pushing "managed trade" policies).
" Kyodo, supra note 13; see also infra notes 98- 83 and accompanying text.
3 William DiBenedetto, Apple Farmers Try, Try Again: Northwest Growers Hope for Japan
Success, J. COM., Sept. 20, 1996, at 3A.
34 Id
" Keith Collins, National Agricultural Statistics Service: Agricultural Outlook-April 1998 Part 1,
M2 PRESSWIRE, Mar. 26, 1998, at 15.
36 Id
3' The suit was apparently to no avail. Holman, supra note 13.
"' Id; Japanese Apple Growers, Researchers Protest Move to Allow US. Apple Imports, II INTVL
TRADE REP. 1104 (1994); Japanese farmers publicized the use of chemicals and the long transport time needed
for imported apples. Yoko Mizui, Samples From the Kingdom of Fruit, DAILY YOMIURI, Nov. 25, 1995, at 8.
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B. Foreign Apple Sales in Japan
In January 1995, the first U.S. apples were legally imported and sold
in Japan.39 Shipments were limited to Red and Golden Delicious, because
U.S. apple growers had originally submitted the test data requested by
MAFF only for these varieties.40 Initial sales were encouraging,4 and both
U.S. government and apple industry officials predicted sales of US$60 to
100 million per year.42 In reality, sales fell far short of those projections,
totaling US$15 million in 1995 and just US$1.5 million in 1996.43 As of
1997, no U.S. apples were being shipped to Japan although the import
protocol remains in effect. 44  U.S. apple growers decided to wait for
negotiation of further liberalization of Japanese apple import regulations.45
Another reason Washington apple growers gave up on the difficult Japanese
market 46 was to take advantage of easier sales markets in Mexico and
Asia.47 However, they may again be attracted to the Japanese market
" All of the approved and exported apples were from Washington State. 1996 U.S. DEP'T. AGRIC.
REP: JAPANESE IMPORTS OF HORTICULTURE PRODUCTS FROM THE UNITED STATES NEARLY DOUBLE SINCE
1990 - Part 2 [hereinafter 1996 Japan Report] available in WESTLAW, WL 11833493.
40 U.S. Apples Move Closer to Entering the Japanese Market: Japanese Quarantine Officials
Recently Approved 17 Apples Orchards Totaling Approximately 1,200 acres for Shipment to Japan,
WORLD HORTICULTURE TRADE & U.S. EXPORT OPPORTUNITIES, Oct. 1994, available in LEXIS, News
Library, laccgn File, IAC-ACC-No: 5753240. However, some reports indicate that MAFF only
requested data on the prevailing Red and Golden Delicious varieties and it was, therefore, not the U.S.
growers' choice. Les Blumenthal, APEC: Washington Apples Face Tough Road in Japan, TACOMA
NEWS TRIBUNE, Nov. 13, 1995, at B5.
"' The initial consumer interest and demand were so high, that many retailers doubled the prices for
U.S. apples. Craig Forman, Japan Retailers Lift Price of US. Apples, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 1995, at
A-p16 Col. 3; Steve Wilhelm, Apple Exports to Japan Fall Short of Goal, PUGET SOUND BUS. J., Mar. 31-
Apr. 6, 1995, at I.
" Lyndsay Griffiths, Tokyo Trade Barriers Hurt Japan Too, Reuter Business Report, Nov. 12, 1993;
DiBenedetto, supra note 2.
" Mickey Kantor, Remarks of United States Trade Representative Mickey Cantor at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies Brefing: Upcoming Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit in
Osaka, Federal News Service, Nov. 9, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Fednew File; DiBenedetto
supra note 2. In 1995, Japanese customs recorded 8,934,896 kilograms (One standard box of apples
weighs 42 pounds or 20 Kilograms so approximately 490,000 boxes) of U.S. apples entering Japan. JAPAN
TARIFF ASSOCIATION, JAPAN EXPORTS & IMPORTS 1995 337 (Commodity No. 0808.10-000)(1995). In
1996, only 404,292 kilograms (21,000 boxes) were recorded. JAPAN TARIFF ASSOCIATION, JAPAN
EXPORTS & IMPORTS 1996 359 (Commodity No. 0808.10-000)(1996). This number conflicts with the
50,000 boxes often reported as sold in Japan in 1996. See Wilhelm supra note 12; Jiji, supra note 5.
" Collins supra note 35; Jiji supra note 5; Japan Apple Market Is Something of a Lemon, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 9, 1996, at D7.
4 Steve Wilhelm, Apple Growers Take Japan to WTO, PUGET SOUND BUS. J., Nov. 28, 1997, at 3.
4" See Haley, supra note 14, at 421 (pointing out that, "even if there were no barriers of any sort to
entry, it is not at all certain that many U.S. firms would choose to enter Japan.").
" During this same time frame of 1995-1996, U.S. apple exports to other countries in Asia and
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because most other Asian export markets have collapsed since 1997, prices
have declined, and U.S. apple crops continue to set record volumes.48
The export of only Red and Golden Delicious proved to be a mistake
because Japanese consumers clearly preferred sweeter varieties with thin,
easy-to-peel skins over Red and Golden Delicious.4 9 Restricted to those two
varieties, U.S. growers were not able to export other varieties when Red and
Golden Delicious sales faltered.
Other countries exporting apples to Japan gained approval for
multiple varieties of apples and have faired better. Souih Korea has shipped
a small number of apples for processing to Japan since 1971, but greatly
increased shipments after 1994.5o New Zealand was the only other country
to gain approval and sell foreign apples in Japan before the U.S., and was
subject to similar regulatory requirements as the United States." One
important difference between the regulatory approval granted to New
Zealand and that granted to the U.S., is the number of varieties included.
New Zealand submitted testing data, and was approved for all of their major
apple varieties including Gala, Granny Smith, Fuji, Braeburn, Red
Delicious, and Royal Gala.5 2 When Japanese consumers rejected Red and
Golden delicious apples in favor of sweeter varieties, New Zealand
exporters were able to adjust to the market.5 3  However, New Zealand's
Mexico set record numbers in volume and profits, so U.S. apple growers had little incentive to develop the
market in Japan and instead focused on other, more profitable export markets. Wilhelm, supra note 12.
Five Asian nations: Taiwan, Thailand, Hong Kong, Indonesia and the Philippines each imported one
million or more boxes of U.S. apples compared to Japan's 50,000. Id
"' Elliot Blair Smith, California Feels Asia's Pain: Exports Fall, Tensions Rise as Crisis Waves Lash
Coast, USA TODAY, Feb. 12, 1998, at BI (referring to Washington Apple Commission reported showing
apple export declines from 1997 to 1998 as of January 31: China -77.5%, Thailand -71.3%, Malaysia -64. 1%,
Indonesia -63.6%, Philippines -54%, Singapore -48.5%, Taiwan -17.8%, Hong Kong -14.9%). In addition,
Mexico increased the tariffon U.S. apples to 101% in September of 1997 that greatly reduced sales. Lynda V.
Mapes, The Polish is Offthe Apple, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 2, 1997, at J 1; Mapes, supra note 22.
" See infra notes 128-130 and accompanying text.
'o Japanese Imports of U.S. Apples Fall to One-Tenth of Previous Season's Total, Int'l Trade Daily
(BNA), Apr. 25, 1996. Imports of Korean Fuji apples surged from 7 tons in 1994 to 171 tons in 1995.
1997 Japan Fruit Report, supra note 18.
" New Zealand first sent small, sweet, thin-skinned Royal Gala apples from New Zealand weighing
about two hundred grams, which were about half the price of domestic Japanese apples. N. Z San Ringo
Jriku, Jiyilka Gosho No Honkaku Yunyd [New Zealand Apples Landing, The First Actual Imports Since
Trade Liberalization], Kyodo, May 17, 1994; Satoshi Isaka. New Zealand Offers Reform Lessons:
Ambassador Says Countries Can Learn From Each Other, NIKKEI WEEKLY, Nov. 10, 1997, at 20.
"2 Shokubutsu Boeki Ho Shiko Kisoku [Plant Epidemic Law Enforcement Regulations] Nihon
Genko Hoki Vol. 45 Section 29 Nogyo [Agriculture] at Table 2 Index No. 224.
.' See infra notes 127-157 and accompanying text. Other nations including New Zealand, France,
and Korea are now exporting small quantities to Japan. Those current exporters along with China have
expressed a desire for decreased apple import regulations and increased market access to Japan. Japan, EU
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success as an exporter of apples to Japan, has not been as strong as
anticipated, due in part to the same market difficulties that defeated U.S.
exports. 4 Apple growers from New Zealand and around the world continue
to lobby for increased access to the Japanese market, often parallel to and
taking advantage from U.S. diplomatic efforts.5
III. REGULATORY ANALYSIS
To understand the United States' complaint, it is important to
understand the legal meaning of regulations in Japan. MAFF acted
predictably and in accordance with past practice on the apple issue, and
both U.S. trade negotiators and apple exporters failed to anticipate or work
through the regulatory difficulties.
A. Transition from Prohibition to Regulation
Before the Apple Agreement, the United States complained, in effect,
about a lack of regulations providing for the process of apple imports. Now
that specific regulations provide for apple imports, a number of general
agricultural regulations also automatically apply. MAFF general
regulations require approval and licensing from the Minister of Agriculture
for the sale of any agricultural products in Japan.56 This required licensing
of new agriculture imports in effect increases regulatory control over
imported products because no regulation or control was needed when the
products were prohibited. This kind of liberalization of market entry with
increased regulation has been termed "re-regulation" as opposed to
deregulation.5 7  Re-regulation is partially motivated by bureaucratic
infighting and attempts to increase a Ministry's authority. 8 By listing U.S.
Agree on Quarantine Rules for Agricultural Produce, DAILY YOMIURI, Aug. 13, 1997, at 14; French
Apples Penetrate Japanese Market, AGRI-INDUSTRY EUROPE, Dec. 19, 1997; Evelyn Iritani, China at the
Core of US. Apple Grower's Woes, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1997, at DI.
"4 Japan's imports of New Zealand apples fell from 235 tons in 1994 to 190 in 1995. Japanese
Imports of U.S. Apples Fall to One-Tenth of Previous Season's Total, supra note 50; see also 1997 Japan
Fruit Report, supra note 18.
"' Barry Krissoff et al., Barriers to Trade in Global Apple Markets, M2 PRESSWIRE, Aug. 25, 1997,
available in LEXIS, Market Library, Iacnws File.
56 No-sambutsu Kakaku Antei Ho [Agriculture Production Price Stabilization Law] Law No. 222 of
1953, art. 8.
"7 STEVEN K. VOGEL, FREER MARKETS, MORE RULES: REGULATORY REFORM IN ADVANCED
INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES 3 (Peter J. Katzenstein ed., 1996).
11 Id. at 204.
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apple imports as subject to approval, MAFF retains discretionary control
over the approval process, as opposed to certification by objective criteria or
standards. 9 This kind of "strategic reinforcement" is a noted pattern in
Japanese regulatory reform. 60
Attempts at liberalization without re-regulation in order to increase
competition have been short lived in Japan, and generally undermined by
bureaucratic resistance.6" The lack of competition in regulated sectors
coupled with the added cost of complying with Japan's complicated sales
regulations are often blamed for the comparatively high retail prices faced
by Japanese consumers. 62 U.S. officials thus argue that trade liberalization
is as much to benefit Japanese consumers with lower prices as it is for U.S.
exporters, but lower prices are often lost in increased regulation.
63
In the case of apples, the critical mechanism of control shifted from
prohibition, to inspection and discretionary approval. Even if the
inspections are scientifically justified, the slow, intentional, and controlling
implementation of apple import requirements amounted to a control
mechanism for MAFF.64 In the opinion of U.S. growers, these actions
delayed the introduction of U.S. apples after the Apple Agreement, averted
significant retail price competition, and limited the ability of export growers
to quickly introduce new varieties to meet consumer demands.6' This kind
of discretionary control generally follows significant and deliberate delay in
legal reform in Japan.66 The pattern of strategic reinforcement was
exemplified when MAFF delayed the implementation of an import
inspection protocol and then helped prepare Japanese apple growers for the
possible competitive effect of less expensive imports.67
I Id.
The pattern of liberalizing, but strictly regulating, imports is "strategic" because a ministry has not
liberalized for the sake of liberalization, but has selectively introduced competition in specific markets
while simultaneously ensuring that domestic firms survive and prosper with as little disruption as possible.
The term "reinforcement" applies when the government has not retreated from intervention, but instead has
reorganized its apparatus for intervention by rearranging policies and reinforcing critical mechanisms of
ministry control. Id. at 207.
61 Emily Thorton, Deregulation Dawdle: Japan's Reform Promises Have Produced Little Action,
FAR E. ECON. REV., Sept. 29, 1994, at 58.
62 Id.
63 Barshefsky, supra note 12, at 1289.
See VOGEL, supra note 57, at 211.
65 Evans, supra note 5.
66 VOGEL, supra note 57, at 211.
67 American Consulate-Sapporo Telegraph, Aug. 18, 1994, (visited Nov. 7, 1998) <http://www.
gwjapan.comlftp/pub/business/imi/aug/im940819.m13>. This preparation closely follows documented
accounts of past liberalization practice. VOGEL, supra note 57, at 208.
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B. Patterns in Japanese Trade Regulation
Japanese trade law, structured in large part by the Allied Occupation
authority in Japan after WWII, allows for bureaucratic regulation and
restriction of foreign trade.68 Japan's bureaucratic structure contributed to the
erection of nearly impenetrable barriers against outside competitors by
providing for broadly defined discretionary authority and an array of approval
and licensing powers that remain in place from Occupation reforms.69
Many foreign industries have faced significant official and structural
impediments to importing and selling goods in Japan, but long-term
perseverance has often led to market penetration and eventual success.70
However, the highest profile trade disputes such as automobiles and
electronics have been "resolved" by voluntary restraints on Japanese
exports after U.S. threats of retaliation, rather than by addressing Japan's
regulatory barriers to U.S. imports.7' Consequently, where a specific U.S.
industry's interest is purely in exporting to Japan, and not limiting Japanese
competition in the U.S. market, the American negotiating leverage is not as
effective. Even the most successful examples of U.S. export-oriented trade
agreements for citrus and beef were settled in the shadow of U.S. threats to
limit Japanese industrial export access to the U.S. market.72
Like the automobile, citrus and beef disputes, the apple dispute is
often used as a political rallying point in both the U.S. and Japan because of
the heavily symbolic and political nature of agricultural trade issues. 73 The
U.S. is stereo-typed as an arrogant bully demanding guaranteed market
share, while Japan is characterized as a cheat, creating any excuse to keep
its markets closed and internal consumer prices high.74 However, the apple
" Haley, supra note 14, at 406.
61 Id at411.
70 The struggle for success by U.S. businesses facing Japanese regulatory restrictions; including
Coca-Cola, McDonalds, and IBM are well documented. See LOOK JAPAN LTD., TAKING ON JAPAN (1988);
KENICHI OMAE, THE BORDERLESS WORLD 9 (1990).
7' Haley, supra note 15, at 415, 419-20.
72 Jean Heiman Grier, The Use of Section 301 to Open Japan's Markets to Foreign Firms, 17 N.C. J.
INT'L L. & COM REG. 1 (1992); see also infra notes 178-183 and accompanying text.
" Upham, supra note 7, at 375; S. COHEN, UNEASY PARTNERSHIP: COMPETITION AND CONFLICT INU.S.-JAPANESE TRADE RELATIONS 7 (1985); see generally Nightline (ABC television broadcast, Apr. 15,
1996)(Transcript # 3886: John Deutsch, Ezra Vogal, George Packard and Yoshi Tsurumi discuss
adversarial images of Japan in the U.S. media).
" Reich et al., supra note I1, at 151; COHEN, supra note 73, at 2; Shotaro Yachi, Beyond Trade
Frictions-A New Horizon for U.S.-Japan Economic Relations, 22 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 389, 392 (1989).
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dispute is deeply grounded in local interests and is complicated by cultural
attitudes towards the proper role of government in solving agricultural and
trade problems.
75
C. Contrasts in US. and Japanese Agency Function
Administrative agencies in the U.S. and Japan take substantially
different approaches to their basic functions.7 6  Japanese bureaucracies
coordinate and manage domestic interests with little direct enforcement or
coercive authority, while U.S. trade and agricultural bureaucracies are
expected to respond to domestic demands with decisive and legally binding
policies and standards.17  American negotiators in the apple dispute have
asked Japan to implement American style binding regulations providing for
the import of apples, while Japanese negotiators expect the American side
to see how destabilizing such mandates would be for their dependence on a
cooperative regulatory structure.78
MAFF is able to enforce agricultural regulations through
"administrative guidance" (gyosei shido).79 No penalty is provided for in
the Plant Epidemic Prevention Law or Regulations if apples were to be
imported without Ministry of Agriculture approval. It is common for
Japanese regulations not to provide any penalty for violation, because there
is no authorization for the agency to enforce penalties.80 Administrative
bodies in Japan gain voluntary cooperation through essentially non-binding
directions, suggestions, requests, warnings, advice, notices, practical
guidance and other acts often without any codified authority or basis of
enforcement.8 ' Informality and avoidance of objective standards contribute
"' Haley, supra note 14, at 404.
71 See John 0. Haley, Governance by Negotiations: A Reappraisal of Bureaucratic Power in Japan,
in THE TRADE CRISIS: How WILL JAPAN RESPOND? 177 (Kenneth B. Pyle ed., 1987) [hereinafter Haley,
Governance by Negotiation].
17 Haley, supra note 14, at 417.
7 Id at416.
71 Yoriaki Narita, Gyosei Shido [Administrative Guidance], 4 GENDA! Ho [Contemporary Law] 131
(1966), reprinted in THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM 353 (Hideo Tanaka ed. & James L. Anderson trans.,
1976). Japan's Administrative Procedures Act, Law No. 88 of 1993, defined administrative guidance as,
"any act, not being a disposition, such as a direction, recommendation or suggestion by an administrative
body, in order to ask for performance or nonperformance by a particular citizen with a view of achieving a
policy aim within the sphere of competence of said administrative body." Administrative Procedures Act,
Law No. 88 of 1993, translated in Lorenz Kdderitzsch, Japan's New Administrative Procedure Law:
Reason's for its Enactment and Likely Implications, 24 L. JAPAN 105, 117 (1994).
so Haley, Governance by Negotiation, supra note 76, at 18 1.
I d.
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to the effectiveness of administrative guidance.82  Apple importers,
wholesalers, and retailers of unapproved apples could be subject to
administrative guidance if the MAFF provisions were not followed. 3
D. Bureaucratic Competition in Japan
Internal Japanese bureaucratic competition for influence and
authority may help explain the structure of agricultural trade regulations as
much as farmers' interests in avoiding competition. Agricultural import
negotiations in Japan are essentially controlled by two ministries, the
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries ("MAFF"), discussed above,
and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry ("MITI"). MAFF
holds a dominant position in negotiations for agricultural imports to Japan. 4
If MAFF were to compromise or allow unrestricted imports, it would lose
economic and political influence over its farming constituents.8 5
MAFF maintains influence and leverage over domestic farmers
partially by protecting them from foreign competition. 6 The Ministry's
express purpose is to promote the welfare of Japanese farmers and foster the
production of agriculture.87 Therefore, foreign competition disrupts MAFF
authority to manage and promote domestic interests, and is contrary to the
ministry's purpose.88 On the other hand, discretionary regulations that
allow MAFF to control the variety, volume, and timing of imported apples
actually increase MAFF's ability to influence farmers and consumers by
controlling the distribution of the new imports.8 9
MITI traditionally controls foreign trade negotiations outside of
agriculture.9" In contrast to MAFF, MITI is more likely to endorse the
32 FRANK K. UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR JAPAN 207 (1987).
s3 For example, the Agricultural Transport license required by the Agriculture Production Price
Stabilization Law could be denied. Supra note 56.
14 WORNOFF, supra note 11, at 29.
85 Id.
16 Haley, Governance by Negotiation, supra note 76, at 177.
" Norinsho Settchi Ho [Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries Establishment Law], Law
No. 153 of 1949, art. 3(l). John 0. Haley, Japan's Postwar Civil Service: The Legal Framework, in THE
JAPANESE CIVIL SERVICE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 75, 85 (Hyung-Ki Kim et al. eds., 1995).
" Professor Haley notes that the Japanese administrative practices of persuasion and collective
agreements with industry are incompatible with U.S.-style mandatory compliance. Haley, Governance by
Negotiation, supra note 77, at 190. MAFF's systematic consensual controls would be disrupted by the
coercive legal regulations that American trade negotiators seek.
"' Reich et al., supra note 11, at 184.
90 CHALMERS JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE 75 (1982).
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principle of liberalized trade and deregulation for the benefit of Japanese
export industries.9 This awkward overlap of ministerial authority for
international trade (MITI) and agriculture issues (MAFF) has often been
exploited by U.S. trade negotiators who threaten Japanese access to U.S.
markets for industrial products in order to gain concessions in other sectors
such as agriculture.9" However, when politically expedient, even MITI will
protect an industry from foreign competition and forsake the free market
ideals that generally benefit Japanese industry.
93
MAFF responsibility to promote and support agriculture in Japan
inherently weighs against the unfettered import of agricultural products.94
However, demographics indicate a near term decrease in apple farmers, the
constituency motivating MAFF resistance to imports.95 Although apple
farmers are presently important in politically concentrated rural districts,
their political and economic influence will decrease as the number of active
farmers continues to decline by attrition.96 In the meantime, MAFF
continues to draft regulations that protect the dying industry because it is
politically advantageous to support unified farmers against the giant threat
of foreign apples.
97
E. Apple Import Regulations
As discussed above, Japanese administrative procedures generally do
not parallel U.S. patterns of coercive and binding regulation. Therefore, the
following textual analysis of Japanese regulations will not reveal any
legally binding standards or be of use in challenging the primarily
discretionary actions of MAFF. On the other hand, analysis of the relevant
regulations is useful here for comparing the treatment of different
agricultural products and to track the codification of the Apple Agreement.
9' WORONOFF, supra note 1I, at 29.
9 Reich et al., supra note 11, at 182-83.
3. MARK RAMSEYER & FRANCES MCCALL ROSENBLUTH, JAPAN'S POLITICAL MARKETPLACE 121,
129-131 (1993) (discussing how the Ministry of International Trade and Industry drafted numerous anti-trust
exemptions for the textile industry for political considerations while admitting that the industry was doomed).
9 MAFF Establishment Law, Law No. 153 of 1949; see supra text accompanying note 87.
9 One economist noted, "[The agricultural protectionism dispute] will be solved by demographic
transition and the migration of young people from rural to urban areas. Most farmers today are elderly."
LEON HOLLERMAN, JAPAN, DISINCORPORATED, THE ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION PROCESS 45-46 (1988).
96 Official MAFF statistics show that 46% of male and 39% of female farmers were aged 65 or over
in 1995. MAFF, Agriculture in Japan: Results of the 1995 Census ofAgriculture (visited Nov. 24, 1998)
<http://www.maff.go.jp/cen-ei.html>.
9' RAMSEYER& ROSENBLUTH, supra note 93.
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1. Text of the Japanese Regulatory Amendment Authorizing US. Apples
On the same day that President Clinton announced the Apple
Agreement, MAFF published the regulatory amendment that allows U.S.
apples into Japan. 98 This amendment came in the form of a Ministerial
Order (Jirei), which added U.S. apples to a list of agricultural goods
recognized by the MAFF as eligible for approval. The operative part of the
amendment translated into English reads:
In Appendix to Table 1-4 plant section after "Apples that are in
conformity with the standard requirements of the Minister,"
add, "and also Red Delicious and Golden Delicious varieties of
apple originating from the United States of America, without
passing through any other territory, in conformity with
standard requirements and approved by the Minister.99
With MAFF's addition of U.S. apples to the allowable fruit list, U.S.
apples became eligible for exemption from the Plant Epidemic Prevention
Law, and thereby allowable for importation.' 0 Significantly, the final
approval for apples apparently remains at the discretion of MAFF under this
regulation because they must still be "approved by the Minister." This does
not mean that approval will be granted, only that it will now be considered.
This amendment places no limitations on MAFF implementation or
inspection procedures, and such a minimalist approach to codifying rules is
consistent with Japanese administrative practice.'0 '
" The full text of the amendment reads:
Pursuant to the Plant Epidemic Prevention Law (Law No. 151 of 1950) Article 7 Section 1 Part
I, the Plant Epidemic Prevention Enforcement Law Regulation is hereby revised in part in
accordance with the following. By order of Ogawara Taiichiro, Minister of Agriculture,
Forestry and Agriculture Aug. 22, 1994. A Ministry Order amending the Plant Epidemic
Prevention Law Enforcement Regulation in part. The Plant Epidemic Prevention Law
Enforcement Regulation (1950 MAFF Order 73) is hereby amended in part.
Shokubutsu Boeki Ho Shiko Kisoku lchibu Kaisei Suru [Amendment to the Plant Epidemic Law
Enforcement Regulations], No. 1468-2 J6rei [Ministerial Order] Kanp6 [National Regulations] Monday
Aug. 22, 1994 Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Order No. 53.
I d.
10' Haley, Governance by Negotiation, supra note 76, at 179.
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2. Effects of the Amendment
With this amendment, MAFF literally gives itself authority to allow
the importation of apples meeting its own approval." 2 In one sense, the
amendment has no affirmative meaning, because it was promulgated by the
ministry itself and still requires the discretionary approval of the ministry to
import the apples. °3 This discretion was already generally established by
the Plant Epidemic Prevention Law.1"4 On the other hand, by listing Red
and Golden delicious varieties specifically, it excludes any other varieties
even from consideration for approval.
Authorized by the Plant Epidemic Prevention Law,'0 5 the thrust of
Plant Epidemic Law Enforcement Regulations is to prohibit any import or
domestic transport of plants and agricultural products, with exceptions
listed in separate tables. 6 These regulations also specify the pest and
disease screening to be performed on imported fruit in order to prevent
infestation in Japan.0 7 In addition to import licensing, the regulation
requires an agricultural transport license to distribute agricultural products,
although the criteria for granting such a license again are not included in the
regulation and are apparently left to MAFF discretion.'0 Notably, Section
14 of the regulation allows for the entry of seedling plants into Japan,
including citrus, apples, and pears as long as they are in transit to other
countries,0 9 indicating less concern with risk of disease than domestic
competition from the fruit products.
In addition, a special 1997 exemption allows sample products for
display in museums, display gardens, or public exhibitions.' 0  This
exemption appears to have been created in response to an episode in 1993
when the Washington Apple Commission ("WAC") was denied permission
to bring in apples for display at a trade show of "American Food." After
being denied, WAC staged a table of empty boxes labeled "empty promises
102 Amendment, supra note 98.
103 Id.
'0' Shokubutsu Boeki Ho [Plant Epidemic Law], Law No. 551 of 1950.
05 Id.
Plant Epidemic Law Enforcement Regulations, supra note 52, at 2662-2663. These regulations
were first implemented on June 30, 1950, and have been amended nearly every year since. id. at 2662.
0.7 Id ch. 2, art. 5-2 (Import Plant Testing).
Os Id ch. 4-2, art. 35(3). Certain kinds of products are exempt from testing, such as dried roots,
scent enhancing dried goods (Ukon), dried macadamia nuts, almonds, cashews, cocoa, pepper, pistachios,
and Persian walnuts. Id. ch. 2, art. 5(3).
9 id. ch. 2, art. 14(3).
"O Id. ch. 2, art 6-2(I)
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= empty boxes" which gained wide spread media attention in Japan and
embarrassed officials at MAFF."'
The operative sections of the Plant Epidemic Prevention Regulations
which affect apple exports are Sections 8 and 9 which outline procedures
for plant quarantine inspectors on import, transport and packaging."' I
Prohibited items, containers, or packaging that are imported into Japan must
have certified import approval."' Section 9 incorporates a table (betsuhyo
ni) into the regulation by reference which lists the plants or products that are
eligible for exemption by country or area." 4  Section 9 is the shortest
provision in the regulation, but perhaps the most important to produce
importers because of the table listing products which MAFF will approve
for importation to Japan." 5 The exemption table itself is eight pages long,
and is structured in two columns and three rows listing the allowable origin,
plant, and any additional comments." 6
The Apple Agreement, therefore, did create a regulatory change in
Japan recognizing the import of Red and Golden Delicious apples, but due
to the nature of regulatory function in Japan, that change does not eliminate
discretion or create any concrete standards for U.S. growers to follow.
F. Japanese Apples in the United States
The other component of the Apple Agreement, namely the import of
Japanese apples to the U.S., has attracted much less media attention than
U.S. apples in Japan." 7 MAFF announced that as of August 17, 1994, the
.. Evans, supra note 5.
12 Plant Epidemic Law Enforcement Regulations supra note 52. ch. 2, art. 8
'' Id ch. 2, art. 8(I).
14 Id. ch. 2, art. 9(1). A curious result of this grouping structure is that in sections 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 13 andAppendix 2, the Hawaiian islands often appear as a country. In section 2, the Hawaiian islands are listed in a
group of primarily developing countries as eligible to send apples to Japan. This illustrates how the text of the
regulation is not operative outside of MAFF discretion that alleviates internal inconsistencies in drafting.
.. Id. ch. 2, art. 9
"6 The relevant section translated from Table 2-2 (emphasis added):
Origin: 2) India, Indonesia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Taiwan, PeoplesRepublic of China. Pakistan, Bangladesh, East Timor, Philippines, Brunei, Hong Kong, Malaysia,
Myanmar, Laos, Papa New Guinea, Hawaiian Islands, Micronesia
Plant: Citrus (varieties defined in section 10), Acerola, Avocado, ... Grapes, Peaches, Plums,
Cherry plums, Ran button, Apples ....
Comment: Excluding tangerine varieties.
.' Three weeks after the arrival of U.S. apples in Japan, fifteen tons of Fuji apples from Aomori
prefecture in Northwest Japan were shipped to Los Angeles to be marketed as exotic gourmet apples, but no
other Japanese apple sales in the U.S. have been reported. First Batch of Japanese Apples Leaves for U.S.,
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U.S. had taken administrative action to lift the ban on importing Japanese
grown apples previously prohibited by health regulations.' 18 The U.S. Plant
Quarantine Act of 1912 authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to issue
regulations restricting the import of plant products that create a risk of
injurious plant diseases or insect pests entering the United States." 9
Regulations relating to fruits and vegetables require importers to obtain
permission to import fresh fruit into the United States, and require
inspection at the port of entry.' 20 If a particular crop in a producer country
is known to be infested with pests or disease, then permission for entry is
denied until an acceptable treatment protocol is established and approved by
the U.S. Department of Agriculture.121
The U.S. import regulations are structured in much the same manner as
their Japanese counterparts.' 22  The fact that Japanese apples could be
administratively approved for import to the U.S. pursuant to the Apple
Agreement illustrates that U.S. apple import regulations are subject to
political decisions as much as to scientific concerns. The U.S. regulatory
action approving Japanese apples closely resembles Japan's in that ostensibly
health related regulations were simply changed by political directive. 1
23
IV. REASONS WHY U.S. APPLE EXPORTS TO JAPAN FAILED
Commentators and industry representatives have offered a number of
inconclusive explanations for the rapid decline in U.S. apple sales in Japan
after such high expectations.' 24 In brief, the answer is consumer rejection;
yet why Japanese consumers rejected the U.S. apples is not easily
explained. The most prominent factors for Japanese consumer rejection of
U.S. apples were the unsuitable varieties, domestic competition, testing and
protocol requirements, chemical and disease scares, and insufficient
marketing. 25  Resolving each of these issues, on top of increased retail
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Jan. 16, 1995, available in LEXIS, -Asiapc Library, Bbcswb File.
'8 Kyodo, supra note 14.
"9 7 U.S.C.S. §159 (1998).
120 7 C.F.R. §319.56 (1998).
121 Id
122 Japanese Imports of U.S. Apples Fall to One-Tenth of Previous Season's Total, supra note 50.
'2 Exec. Order No. 12,778: 7 C.F.R. § 319 (1995); 59 Fed. Reg. 42,153 (1994); 59 Fed. Reg.
29,557 (1994).
I24 See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
125 William DiBenedetto, US Warns Japan to Expand Apple Menu, WTO Complaint Hinted if
Japanese Don't Bite, J. COM., Oct. 2, 1996, at 3A.
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prices of U.S. goods in Japan due to devaluation of the Yen, 26 will be vital
if future export efforts are to avoid the same fate.
A. Unsuitable Varieties
The clearest factor for Japanese consumer rejection of U.S. apples is
that Red and Golden Delicious apples do not appeal to current Japanese
tastes. 127 Red Delicious apples are also grown in Japan, but have steadily
declined in popularity. 128  This decline indicates that consumers are
rejecting all Red Delicious apples, not just imports. The Red and Golden
Delicious are not sweet enough for Japanese consumers.129 Japanese people
have traditionally peeled and sliced a single apple into sections to share as a
family after a meal; slices are then eaten with small forks or toothpicks. 3 °
This is in stark contrast to the American and European consumption of
apples as snack fruit by picking them up and eating them out of hand
without peeling.' 3 ' Consumer rejection based on taste is not a negotiable
barrier that the Japanese government can be expected to remedy.' 32 On the
other hand, U.S. growers argue that they need the chance to import other
varieties to match Japanese consumer tastes. 133
After the commercial failure of the small Red and Golden Delicious
snack fruit, Washington growers now wish to sell varieties more acceptable to
26 Steve Wilhelm, Soft Yen, Hard Times, PUGET SOUND Bus. J., Feb. 14, 1997, at I.
127 Japanese consumers consistently described the U.S. Red and Golden Delicious apples as "sour"
and "small." One clever farmer was quoted as saying, "I tasted the Red Delicious apples from America,
but they weren't that delicious." Wudunn, supra note 18; Paul Blustein, Japan Tastes U.S. Apples, INTL
HERALD TRIBUNE, Jan. 10, 1995, at Finance.
2' Domestic growers are rapidly replacing Red Delicious trees with the more popular Fuji and
Jonagold varieties. 1997 DEP'T AGRIC., JAPAN: ANNUAL FY 98 MARKETING PLAN INFORMATION REP. (4),
at 3-4 (July 15, 1997), available in WL 12491929 [hereinafter 1998 Marketing Plan]; (listing in a table
entitled Japanese Production of Apples by Variety shows that production of Red Delicious declined from
22,900 to 18,200 and 15,600 metric tons between 1995, 1996 and 1997; and that Golden Delicious are also
grown in Japan, but only in very minor quantities).
129 Michiyo Nakamoto, Imported Apples Fail to Grab Big Slice of Japanese Pie: Worries About Food
Preservatives and Fierce Competition from Local Produce Have Taken Much of the Shine off US.
Exporter's Hopes, FIN. TIMES, May 16, 1996, at 4; Mark Magnier, Japanese Market Still Strong for US.
Growers, J. COM., Feb. 26, 1996, at 7A; Blustein supra note 31.
30 1998 Marketing Plan, supra note 128; personal observation of the author while living with a
Japanese family from 1989-1990.
"' Id One WAC official noted, "Getting people to bite into an apple-they just haven't done that."
Blumenthal. supra note 40.
32 Intractable issues like consumer rejection are not structural impediments that can simply be
resolved by the Japanese government. Yachi supra note 74, at 396.
33 Postman, supra note 2.
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Japanese consumers including Fuji and Gala.'34 New Zealand's 1994 import
approval included Granny Smith, Braeburn, and Royal Gala apples and was
subject to essentially the same insect and disease prevention processes
required for U.S. apples, and the U.S. seeks similar approval.' 35 Because
New Zealand submitted testing data on multiple varieties for original
approval, when Japanese consumers rejected the Red Delicious apples, more
of the other varieties were shipped. 36  U.S. growers did not yet grow
substantial amounts of the non-Delicious varieties when MAFF testing began
in the early 1980s, and could not have submitted them from the beginning.
31
There is some dispute about whether or not U.S. apple growers have
conducted and submitted to Japanese authorities test data for additional
varieties after the Apple Agreement.
3 8
B. Chemical and Disease Scares
An additional high profile factor in the Japanese consumer rejection
of U.S. apples was a public fear of harmful chemicals. 139 A trace detection
of a preservative not approved in Japan, Thiabendazole ("TBZ"), led
Japanese customs to temporarily stop unloading of U.S. apples in the
summer of 1995, leaving some shipments in port for over a month. 4 ° The
Washington Apple Commission investigated and concluded that the source
of the detected preservative was residue from the rollers at a single packing
house, which had processed pears preserved with TBZ before packing
apples bound for Japan.14 ' Many retailers refused to stock the imported
apples even after the presence of TBZ was explained and customs cleared
new shipments. 
142
In November of 1996, an E. coli outbreak in Washington, Oregon,
California, and British Columbia was traced back to unpasteurized apple
cider.' 43 This outbreak was eventually attributed to contaminants, and not
134 Id
... Kyodo, supra note 51.
131 Isaka, supra note 51.
' Interview with Bill Bryant, Bryant Christie Inc., International Affairs Advisor to the Northwest
Fruit Growers Association, in Seattle, Wash. (Oct. 21, 1998).
' Id. Cf Hiro Aida, US. Criticizes Japanese Apple Testing at WTO, Japan Econ. News Wire, Oct. 9,
1996; see also Farm Minister Defends Testing of US. Apple Imports, JAPAN WEEKLY MONITOR, Oct. 14, 1996.
9 Blumenthal, supra note 40.
' Evans, supra note 5.
141 Id.
142 Id
14' Federal microbiologists found a "smoking gun" in the E. coli disease outbreak: a strain of the
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apples, but the news spread quickly to Japan, where an E. coli epidemic had
already caused a national panic earlier in 1996.144 Sales of U.S. apples
dropped sharply after the E. coli reports, and Japanese trade negotiators
referred to the E. coli outbreak as proof that Japan had reason to carefully
test every variety of apples before allowing them into Japan. 145
C. Insufficient Marketing
As an attempt to create a new market rather than compete directly
with the high-quality Japanese gift apples, U.S. apple marketers decided to
present smaller apples as "snacks" rather than challenging the Japanese
traditional market for gift or luxury apples. 14 6 This approach was in effect
an attempt to change Japanese eating habits and perception of fruit. The
normal cost of a Japanese-grown apple, packaged individually as a gift, is
Y400 to ¥700 or about five to six U.S. dollars. 147 The introductory price of
U.S. apples in Japan was one-tenth the price of gift apples, but soon
increased due to smaller U.S. harvests and retail mark-ups. 14  The lower
prices attracted first time consumers, but the fall in sales shows that very
few Japanese buyers were repeat customers, and very little effort was made
to promote U.S. apples as anything more than a news item. 149
Moreover, the commitment of U.S. apple exporters to establishing a
long-term presence in the Japanese market is questionable because such
limited resources were allocated to marketing. WAC spent a total of
US$100,000 for marketing and promotion of U.S. imported apples during
the initial year of 1995, roughly another US$100,000 in early 1996 but then
canceled its Japan marketing budget in February of 1996.150 This funding
was not sufficient for a sustained nation-wide promotion effort, and brings
bacteria in a bottle of unpasteurized Odwalla apple juice. Warren King, E. coli Bacteria Found in Apple
Juice, SEATrLE TIMES, Nov. 5, 1996. at Local News.
'" DiBenedetto, supra note 2.
145 id.
146 1998 Marketing Plan, supra note 128; Evans, supra note 5, at Sec. Ill.
141 1998 Marketing Plan, supra note 128.
'4' Bond, supra note 3 1.
"9 DiBenedentto, supra note 33; Matsukawa, supra note 27.
"s This amount could not buy a single nationwide television ad in Japan. Most of the funds went to
the advertising firm of Hill & Knowlton, Japan, for coordinating media coverage of U.S. apples as a
political news story, without brand or product marketing. Matsukawa, supra note 27 at 6-10; Growers
Scale Back Ads, COLUMBIAN, Feb. 12, 1996, at A ll.
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into question the apple growers' true commitment to establishing a
continuing Japanese apple export market.''
Although WAC efforts successfully attracted general media coverage
of the apple imports as a news item, there was no sustained marketing
promotion of U.S. apples outside of gaining media attention as a political or
novelty item.' The small budget is all the more questionable considering
that WAC and its members were granted US$4 million dollars in annual
credits for export promotion.1 3  In contrast to the failure of apple exports,
other U.S. agricultural exports such as oranges and cherries have, after an
initial period of adjustment and accommodation, profitably worked through
regulatory barriers in Japan. 5 4  U.S. citrus and cherry growers have
established ongoing market success based on substantial marketing
investments. 5 5 These models offer lessons for future apple export efforts.
D. Domestic Competition
The snack approach might have been more successful if the Japanese
domestic growers had not introduced their own small, less than perfect Fuji
and Tsugaru apples that sold for prices similar to imported U.S. apples.
5 6
At the same time, a decrease in the value of the yen made the price of U.S.
apples higher than projected.' 5  U.S. apples were less able to compete on
price with the smaller, imperfect and low priced Japanese apples that had
previously gone to processing.' 
5 8
Although Japanese apple industry and Government officials claim
there was no coordinated effort to counter-market the smaller Japanese
"' DiBenedentto, supra note 149.
2 Matsukawa, supra note 27.
" Target Export Assistance/Market Promotion Program credits were annually granted to the WAC
for export promotion by the Department of Agriculture. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION INDUSTRY &
TRADE SUMMARY OF CERTAIN FRESH DECIDUOUS FRUITS supra note 2 1, at 2 1.
" Dunne, supra note 10.
'" Teresa Watanabe, Sunkist Squeezing Out Higher Sales in Japan, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1991, at D3.
56 Mizui, supra note 38; Holloway, supra note 5: Evans, supra note 5.
157 Craig Foreman, Well, How Do You Like Them Apples? They'll Cost You, WALL ST. J., Jan. 13,
1995, at A10.
"' Wilhelm, supra note 45. U.S. producers now hold nearly 40 percent of the processed fruit and
juice concentrate market in Japan. Americans' success exporting processed apple juice concentrate to
Japan displaced the smaller, imperfect Japanese apples from their traditional market and created
competition for U.S. fresh apple exports. U.S. Dep't Agri., Japan's Imported Fruit Juice Market Thrives:
Industry Overview, AGExPORTER, Apr. 1996, at 4. However, a large portion of processed apple product
exports from the U.S. to Japan is from Japanese owned processors. Dan Wheat, Glica Must Tighten its
Belt, WENATCHEE WORLD, Mar. 21, 1997, at A4.
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apples against U.S. imports, the smaller Japanese apples were available in
large quantities and had not been sold as fresh apples before 1995.59 In one
sense, the Japanese consumer did benefit temporarily from the competitive
effect of apple imports, even if the U.S. apple growers did not.
60
V. APPLES V. ORANGES
The regulations for the import of citrus fruit into Japan are similar to
apple regulations in that separate processing and pest treatment are
required, however, there is no regulatory separation of oranges by
variety 16 1 The introduction of U.S. citrus fruit also went through multiple
diplomatic agreements and false starts. 162 In 1978, Japan and the U.S.
agreed to a compromise import agreement allowing only "seasonal citrus,"
allowing imports while protecting Japanese domestic citrus growers. 163
The compromise citrus agreement quickly fell into dispute over
contrasting interpretations of quotas and timelines for increasing U.S. citrus
exports. 164  Japanese farmers also publicly protested the introduction of
imported citrus. 165  The American side threatened Section 301 sanctions,
GATT action, and retaliatory exclusion of Japanese automobiles.
166
Citrus promoters made substantial, long-term marketing investments
in contrast to apple marketing.' 67  The Florida and California Orange
grower associations, and Sunkist in particular, spent millions of dollars on
initial marketing and product development campaigns after entering the
Japanese market under limited volume quotas, and were later able to take a
strong market position when restrictions were reduced. 68 U.S. citrus fruit
exports now dominate the citrus market in Japan.' 6
9
The long-term continuing success of U.S. citrus after initial
regulatory friction indicates the value of building consumer relations by
"s Wudunn, supra note 18.
60 1997 Japan Annual Fresh Deciduous Fruit Report, supra note 18; Japanese Imports of US. Apples
Fall to One-Tenth of Previous Season's Total, supra note 50.
6' 1998 Marketing Plan, supra note 128; see generally, Overview and GATT Panel Report on the
U.S-Japan Beef and Citrus settlement, 27 I.L.M. 1548 (1988).
62 Dunne, supra note 10.
6 Reich et al., supra note 11, at 173.
I Id.
65Id at 175.
d66 I ; for a discussion of Section 301 see supra Section VII A.
167 Watanabe, supra note 155.
163 Id
69 Id; 1996 Japan Report, supra note 39.
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maintaining market presence, even if it is a limited presence because of
regulatory restrictions. U.S. apple importers have now damaged the image
of their product by sending lower quality apples and abruptly pulling out
of the market. 7' In contrast, New Zealand has taken an inside approach,
advertising nationwide and persevering through initial rejection of Red
Delicious apples and adapting to consumer preferences. 7 ' Citrus is not
the only example of successful perseverance in Japan.
VI. APPLES V. CHERRIES
U.S. cherries, primarily from the Pacific Northwest, have enjoyed
twenty years of successful export to Japan, with sales of over US $100
million each year.'72  These exports are regulated under the same
regulatory language used for apples.'73 The import protocol required by
MAFF for cherries is similar to the apple protocol, including initial MAFF
on-sight inspection of cherries, fumigation, and variety specific
documentation.'7 4 The required data on cherry processing is nearly as
detailed as apple testing including 30,000 total tests.'75 However, the
triple inspection of apples each season is, more invasive and expensive
than cherry inspections. 7 6 Unlike the apple growers, cherry growers have
begrudgingly continued to comply with MAFF variety specific requests
and added varieties until almost all major varieties of U.S. cherries were
eligible for export to Japan.177
The examples of successful citrus and cherry imports indicate that
cumbersome regulation alone is not impeding sales of fruit in Japan, and
"70 Red and Golden Delicious apples are known for low cost and long shelf life, not for quality of
flavor. Therefore, new varieties such as Fuji are being widely planted and sold in Washington State and
elsewhere in the U.S. Rick Steigmeyer, Quality Crusade Caps Fruitful 7 Decades in Apple Industry: Auvil
Has Led the Way Among State's Growers, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 18, 1998, at C 1.
'7 Isaka. supra note 5 1.
72 1996 Japan Report, supra note 39; JAPAN TARIFF ASSOCIATION, supra note 43 (Commodity No.
0809.20-000).
' The regulation for cherries reads: "Imported Garnet, Tulare, Bing, Brooks, Lambart, and Rainier
varieties of cherries originating in the United States of America without passing through any other territory
in conformity with the standards and approved by the Minister [are allowed]." Plant Epidemic Prevention
Law, Law No. 151 of 1951, Attachment 19 to Table 2.
" Matsukawa, supra note 27, at 35. Ironically, many of the cherry growers involved in the extended
negotiations with MAFF in 1978 for cherries also grow apples. Id The cherry growers, while generally
successful, also object to the difficult process of adding new varieties.
175 Id.
7 Bryant, supra note 137.
'7 Id; Matsukawa, supra note 27, at 35-37.
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that with persistence and consumer acceptance the current regulations do
permit importation. Even the successful cherry exporters are seeking less
restrictive processes to add new varieties, but have continued to sell in
Japan while working for change. 7 8
VII. REEMERGENCE OF THE APPLE DISPUTE
The failure of U.S. apple sales after 1996 ignited new complaints
against Japan and opened a new chapter in the apple dispute. 7 9 U.S.
officials argued that the Apple Agreement should include other varieties
such as Gala, Fuji, Braeburn, Granny Smith and Jonagold in the Red and
Golden Delicious protocol already in place. 8 ' MAFF rejected that position,
noting that data cannot be applied to other varieties indiscriminately.' 81 The
U.S. contends that MAFF is inhibiting apple imports by requiring lengthy
and redundant testing on each new variety to be introduced.'82 Testing for
the Red and Golden Delicious varieties took seven years to satisfy MAFF,
and the Washington apple growers and scientists insist that codling moth
treatment is in no way affected by variety of apple.1 83 MAFF in tum
contends that other varieties are welcome if the tests show that the treatment
process is effective.' 84
MAFF requirements include: inspections, separate growing areas,
separate processing, and additional fumigation of apples to be sent to
Japan. All off these requirements are at the exporting growers' expense.' 85
U.S. growers initially understood and agreed with the Japanese desire to
'7' Shorrock, supra note I; Bryant, supra note 137.
'7 Shorrock, supra note I.
SQ Toshio Aritake, US.-Japan Apple Talks Fail: US. May Appeal to WTO, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA),
Mar. 11, 1997.
"' Japan, US. Remain Opposite on Apple Quarantine, supra note I; Farm Minister Defends Testing
of U.S. Apple Imports, JAPAN WEEKLY MONITOR, Oct. 14, 1996.
" USTR Ambassador Ira Shapiro is quoted as saying, "We have broken through after 23 years of
getting U.S. apples into Japan only to discover that then there were requirements being put on a variety-by-
variety basis which were inhibiting our exports." Shapiro Reiterates WTO Action on Apples, Jiji Press
Ticker Service, Mar. 6, 1997.
"8 Evans, supra note 5; Matsukawa, supra note 27, at 36-38.
's John Zarocostas, Japan-US Apple Talks Still Bearing No Fruit, J. COM., June 9, 1997, at 2A.
... The fumigation process requires the use of methyl bromide, a harsh but effective fumigation agent
that will be banned in the United States after 2001 under the Clean Air Act. 40 CFR § 82 (1990);
Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 63 Fed. Reg. 9151 (1998). Therefore, after 2001, it will become
impossible for U.S. growers to comply with the current protocol. Patricia B. Demetrio, Unfair to US.
Farms, J. COM., Oct. 21, 1997, at IB; Holloway, supra note 5; Evans, supra note 5. Cf Japan, EU Agree
on Quarantine Rules for Agricultural Produce, supra note 53 (discussing Japan's agreement to split the
quarantine costs of additional inspections with EU exporters due to environmental compliance).
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avoid disease and pests, but now the growers object to the Japanese
position that the same procedures must be separately tested and confirmed
on each variety. 8 6 According to U.S. apple industry officials, the variety
of the apple does not alter the effect of the external disease and pest
control measures, so variety specific testing is not scientifically valid.
18 7
There is also evidence that a strain of fire blight may already exist in
Japan, thus negating the reason for the multiple inspection and separate
growing areas for U.S. apples. 8 Japanese officials strongly deny that fire
blight exists in Japan.
8 9
After failing to gain MAFF inclusion for other varieties under the
Apple Agreement, the U.S. took unilateral action to attack Japan's apple
import requirements with a Section 301 investigation and filed an
eventually successful complaint with the World Trade Organization
("WTO").' 90 Since then, direct U.S.-Japan trade talks have faltered. 1
Although Red and Golden Delicious apples are approved, MAFF will not
apply the data or fumigation processes used in the initial approval for
different varieties from the U.S. and insists that each variety must be tested
separately.' 92 This variety specific testing requirement was the basic issue
of the parallel domestic Section 301 investigation and WTO dispute.
93
s6 Interview with Prof. Dan F. Henderson, Japanese Law Scholar, and Washington State apple
grower, in Seattle Wash. (Jan. 5, 1998).
" According to Hugh W. Ewart, Vice-President of the Northwest Horticulture Council, "The science
is very strong in saying there doesn't need to be additional testing." DiBenedetto, supra note 2.
"' A controversial Japanese researcher, Akio Tanii, committed suicide after being criticized for
publishing research on a disease similar to fire blight (Erwina amylovora) in Japan. Leslie Helm & Gale
Eisenstodt, Japanese Researcher's Suicide Leads to Claims of a Cover-Up, SEATTLE TIMES, June 23,1996,
at FI. The Japanese government insists that the precautions are necessary and that the Japanese fire blight
is an isolated, less harmful strain not affecting apples.
"' Hidemi Taguchi, Japan: 'Cover-Up' Article Paints Misleading Picture of Japan, SEATrLE TIMES,.
Aug. 30, 1996, at B7 (expressing the Seattle Consular General of Japan's disagreement with the Helm &
Eisenstodt article; referring to the Japanese infection as "shoot blight of pear;" following verbatim with
letters which appeared in many newspapers across America signed by various Consular Generals.). Cornell
University researcher Steven Beer, who worked with Tanii, states that the disease is in fact a strain of fire
blight. Holloway, supra note 5.
"9 Initiation of Section 302 Investigation and Request for Public Comment: Japan Market Access
Barriers to Agriculture Products, 62 Fed. Reg. 53,853, Oct. 16, 1997; WTO Dispute Settlement Proceeding
Regarding Varietal Testing and Quarantine Requirements, 62 Fed. Reg. 53,378, Oct. 14, 1997; Japan
Market Access Barriers to Agricultural Products, WTO Dispute No. 301-112 released Oct. 27, 1998,
Complaint by the United States WT/DS76R [hereinafter Panel Decision]; affirmed by Japan-Measures
Affecting Agricultural Products WT/DS76/AB/R, Feb. 22, 1999, [hereinafter Appellate Decision].
191 Zarocostas, supra note 184.
192 d.
193 Ono, supra note 28. USTR has requested public comment on the issue of Japan's variety specific
testing requirements as part of the Super 301 investigation and the WTO claim. WTO Digpute Settlement
Proceeding Regarding Varietal Testing and Quarantine Requirements, 62 Fed. Reg. 53,378, Oct. 14, 1997.
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A. Section 301
The United States initiated a formal investigation of Japan's apple
import regulations in October of 1997 under "Section 301" review. 19 4 Every
major trade negotiation leading to successful market entry for U.S. goods or
services into Japan since 1974 has involved a 301 investigation.195 The
escalation to 301 threats is similar to the pattern of negotiation the U.S.
followed in the 1980s, which led to successful citrus exports to Japan. 196 In
the citrus dispute, the United States threatened to deny the entrance of
Japanese automobiles and other goods into the United States under Section
301 if import limits on U.S. oranges and other citrus products were not
removed.1 97 Section 301 is therefore recognized as an effective means for
promoting U.S. trade interests. 198 In fact, President Clinton reinstated the
expiring Section 301 statutory authority while conducting contentious trade
talks, including the apple issue, with Japan in 1994.199
B. Apple Dispute Goes to the WTO
The United States also challenged Japan's apple import requirements
in the WTO beginning in April of 1997.200 The WTO decided strongly in
'94 Report To Congress on Section 301 Developments (June 1996-January 1998), USTR Home Page(Nov. 1, 1998) <http://www.ustr.gov/reports/301report/sec30l.pdf>. Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974
authorizes and, in some cases, requires the United States to impose trade sanctions against countries with
unfair trade practices. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 241 l(a) (1996). Section 301 gives the President
authority to retaliate against foreign nations with unfair trade practices as determined by the United States
Trade Representative as "unjustifiable, unreasonable, or discriminatory" conduct which burdens the United
States. Id at §241 l(a)(I); see generally Judith Hippler Bello & Alan F. Holmer, Section 301 ofthe Trade
Act of 1974: Requirements, Procedures, and Developments, 7 J. INT'L Bus. L. 633 (I986). The unilateral
use of Section 301 by the United States is contrary to the basic spirit and letter of international trade
agreements such as the WTO, but the United States has refused to abandon the policy in spite of criticism
from trading partners. Judith H. Bello & Allan F. Holmer, The Post-Uruguay Round Future of Section
301, 25 LAW& POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1297, 1305 (1994).
195 Grier, supra note 72.
Reich et al., supra note 1l, at 153.197 ld
198 Id.
' The timing of Section 301 reinstatement was widely considered a show of force against Japan.
Clinton Renews Super 301 Measure, I I INT'L TRADE REP. 363, 367 (1994); Juan P. Morillo, Office ofthe
US. Trade Representative: US.-Japanese Trade Dispute, 25 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1205, 1211 (1994).
" Panel Decision supra note 190; Japan Refutes U.S. Complaint on Apple Testing, supra note 1;
Wilhelm, supra note 45. The World Trade Organization, which has 119 nation members was established
on April 15, 1994 as a successor organization to the General Agreement on Tariffs & Trade (GATT).
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-
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favor of the United States, and found Japan's variety specific testing
requirements in violation of WTO standards.20' Japan appealed the panel
decision, but appeals are limited to issues of law covered in the Panel report
and legal interpretations developed by the Panel, and no errors were
found.2"2  The question presented was whether phytosanitary 20 3 testing and
fumigation data from Red and Golden Delicious apples can be applied to
different U.S. varieties treated by the same process.20 4 WTO member
nations are required to avoid arbitrary or unjustified distinctions and cannot
use phytosanitary measures as trade barriers. 205 The Panel decision against
Japan was consistent with prior WTO and GATT decisions. Before the
Panel decision, most observers concluded that the variety specific testing
requirements had moved beyond the semi-legitimate realm of health
interests into strict protectionism.20 6 However, this favorable WTO ruling
will not solve the apple dispute.
VIII. CONCLUSION
While Japan's discretionary apple import regulations contributed
indirectly to the commercial failure of U.S. apple exports to Japan, Japanese
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. I (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1140 (1994). In the Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, the WTO recognizes the right of member nations to
impose scientifically based phytosanitary requirements on agricultural imports to protect human, animal or
plant health from pests, disease and toxins. AGREEMENT ON THE APPLICATION OF SANITARY AND
PHYTOSANITARY MEASURES, 33 I.L.M. 1125; (1994), Appendix IC GATT Doc. No. MTN/FA, 33 i.L.M.
1125; (1994) [hereinafter SPM Agreement].
501 Panel Decision supra note 190.
202 Ruling May Help U.S. Sell Apples in Japan, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 28, 1998, at E4; see also
Dispute Settlement Understanding art. 16 WTO Home Page (visited Nov. I, 1998) <http://www.wto.org/
wto/dispute/dsu.htm>.
'0' "Phytosanitary" literally means plant (phyto) heath (sani), from Greek referring to issues of
plant disease.
" Zarocostas, supra note 184.
205 SPM Agreement, supra note 200, art. 2, at 2, 3. The SPM Agreement also requires WTO
members to assess the risks of harm prevented by phytosanitary measures and balance those risks with the
WTO desire for standards that do not unnecessarily restrict trade. SPM Agreement, supra note 200 art. 4, at
2. See also GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS: AGREEMENT
ON TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TADE-STANDARDS CODE, 18 I.L.M. 1079; 31 U.S.T. 405 (1979). One
purpose of the 1994 WTO reorganization was to increase scientific discipline on the application of
phytosanitary measures. Id. art. 1. SPM regulations in WTO member states should be easily identifiable,
clear, transparent, and available upon request subject to claims by other member states for WTO review.
SPM Agreement, art 7, Annex B at 3.
" Arthur Alexander, a trade analyst with the Japanese government-funded think tank Japan
Economic Institute states: "[MAFF officials] have probably pushed those legitimate [sanitary] interests into
strict protectionism." Shorrock, supra note I, at 9A.
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consumer rejection of Red and Golden Delicious apples was the ultimate
cause. U.S. efforts to further liberalize Japan's apple import restrictions
will primarily benefit apple exporters who have maintained a market
presence in Japan in spite of the regulatory barriers. By abandoning the
market, U.S. apple growers have damaged their chances for future success.
If U.S. apple growers attempt to export to Japan again, the issues of
domestic and other import competition, consumer preferences, market
development, and now, less favorable exchange rates must be resolved. The
WTO decision in favor of the U.S. alone will be fruitless unless theses other
problems are addressed.
